Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Debra Ekins, aka Debra A. Ekins v. Wallace
Associates Business Properties Group Inc., a Utah
corporation: Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John E. S. Robson; John D. Dunn; Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for Wallace Associates Business
Properties Group.
James C. Swindler; Johnson & Hatch; Attorneys for Debra Ekins.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Ekins v. Wallace Associates Business Properties Group, No. 970573 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1093

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COUHT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

DOCKET NO.

^10*513-Or

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DEBRA EKINS, aka Debra A. Ekins,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
WALLACE ASSOCIATES BUSINESS
PROPERTIES GROUP, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. 970573-CA
Priority 15

Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Ruling of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District Judge (No. 960907623CN)

James C. Swindler, A3177
JOHNSON & HATCH, P.C.
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 363-6363
Attorneys for Debra Ekins

John E. S. Robson, A4130
JohnD. Dunn, A7511
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
Attorneys for Wallace Associates Business
Properties Group

FILED
APR 2 0 1998
130672

COURT OF APPEAL

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DEBRA EKINS, aka Debra A. Ekins,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
WALLACE ASSOCIATES BUSINESS
PROPERTIES GROUP, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. 970573-CA
Priority 15

Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Ruling of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District Judge (No. 960907623CN)

James C. Swindler, A3177
JOHNSON & HATCH, P.C.
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 363-6363
Attorneys for Debra Ekins

John E. S. Robson, A4130
JohnD. Dunn, A7511
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
Attorneys for Wallace Associates Business
Properties Group

130672

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARGUMENT
I.

II.

III.

1

THE PARTIES ARBITRATION AGREEMENT APPLIES TO THIS
DISPUTE

1

THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE

6

A.

THE PARTIES MUTUALLY ASSENTED TO THE AGREEMENT

6

B.

THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT LACK MUTUALITY

7

C.

THE AGREEMENT IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE

9

WALLACE DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATE

CONCLUSION

:/jdd/130672

10
12

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951)

8

American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, 96 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 1996)

11

Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983)

9

Brittonv. Co-op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990)

11

Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992)

11, 12

Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter Inc., 930 P.2d 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

7

Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986)

1, 7

Durfeyv. Board of Education, 604 P. 2d 480 (Utah 1979)

4

Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

7

Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1985)

11

Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1924)

8

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d475 (Utah 1986)

11
1, 7

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)

9

Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983)

11

Rossv. Producers Mut. Ins. Co., 295 P.2d 339 (Utah 1956)

7

Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996)

6, 9, 10
ii

:/jdd/130672

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996)

4

State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982)

4

State v. Sorenson, 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980)

4

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-5(2), (4)

10

Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c)

4

Treatises
17AC.J.S. Contracts § 299 (1963)

:/jdd/130672

6

iii

ARGUMENT
In her brief Ms. Ekins makes several arguments which she claims invalidate her
agreement to arbitrate this dispute. While the brief casts the arguments in several different ways,
Ms. Ekins has raised the same issues raised before the trial court. Specifically, Ms. Ekins argues
that the parties never agreed to arbitrate the instant dispute, that the agreement is unconscionable
and that Wallace waived its right to arbitrate. For the reasons set forth below, Ms. Ekins'
arguments lack merit.
I.

THE PARTIES ARBITRATION AGREEMENT APPLIES TO THIS
DISPUTE.
Ms. Ekins argues that the agreement to arbitrate is a narrow one that should be

narrowly construed. Ms. Ekins cites Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731
P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that ambiguity in an arbitration clause should be
construed against the drafter.
In Docutel, the parties entered into a contract that provided for litigation of claims
arising under credit agreements between the parties. However, another paragraph of the contract
provided that "all disputes arising under this Agreement or pertaining in any manner to the
dealership created by this Agreement shall be resolved by Arbitration by an Appeal Board. . . . "
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds
that the dispute before the court involved a "credit agreement" and was not covered by the
arbitration provision. The trial court held that the specific provision regarding credit agreements
took precedence over the arbitration clause and that arbitration of all claims was not required.
1
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On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court conceded that the contract was "not a model
of clarity." Id. However, the court held that while ambiguities in an agreement are interpreted
against the drafter, it is the policy of the Utah courts "to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner
that favors arbitration." Id. The court further outlined the proper approach to construing the
scope of arbitration clauses:
'Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted
when the issue contested is the scope of the clause.
If the scope of an arbitration clause is debatable or
reasonably in doubt, the clause should be construed
in favor of arbitration. . . .'
Id. (emphasis added).
Ms. Ekins asks this Court to ignore Utah law and construe the scope of the
arbitration provision narrowly. Ms. Ekins' arguments are not well taken when viewed in light of
the undisputed facts. The arbitration agreement between Wallace and Ms. Ekins provides:
In the event of any disagreement or dispute
between Salesperson [Ms. Ekins] and other
salesperson under contract with Broker which
cannot be settled by and between the parties
involved, such matter shall be decided by
arbitration, and Broker and Salesperson agree to be
bound by the terms and provisions of such
decision.
In October, 1995, Ms. Ekins signed a termination agreement with Wallace.
Appellant's Opening Brief, Exhibit "B." That agreement provides that commissions will be paid
to Ms. Ekins for "transactions in process" only (also referred to as a pending transaction). The
commission at issue in this case involves property located in the University of Utah's Research
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Park ("Research Park"). Affidavit of David Jewkes, R.90 ff 5-6. Transactions regarding that
property were listed on the termination agreement. Appellant's Opening Brief, Exhibit "B." The
Termination Agreement also provides that it does not alter or change any provision of the
Independent Contractor Agreement including the arbitration clause.
Three months after signing the Termination Agreement, on January 16, 1996, Ms.
Ekins wrote a letter to Wallace inquiring about the status of the Research Park transaction. A
copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." On the same day, the landlord of the
property in question responded in a letter that the transaction proposed by Ms. Ekins and listed in
the Termination Agreement did not come "to fruition" and all "future proposals would need to be
negotiated from scratch." A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." That letter
indicated that all future negotiations regarding the Research Park property would involve Collin
Perkins, a Wallace salesperson, rather than Ms. Ekins. Wallace sent a copy of this letter to Ms.
Ekins on January 22, 1996. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." Ms. Ekins
did not contact Wallace again regarding the Research Park transaction for over eight months
after she had been informed that there was no pending transaction regarding Research Park.
Ms. Ekins' first argument is that because she has sued Wallace rather than Mr.
Perkins, the arbitration provision does not apply. However, it is clear that Wallace paid the
commission claimed by Ms Ekins to Mr. Perkins, another Wallace salesperson, in early
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October 1996.l Affidavit of David Jewkes, R.91-92, t 18. Mr. Perkins has asserted to
Wallace that he is entitled to that commission and all future commissions arising out of the
Research Park transaction. Affidavit of David Jewkes, R.92, % 20.
Knowing that this evidence is fatal to Ms. Ekins' desire to litigate this dispute,
Ms. Ekins has attempted to exclude any evidence regarding demand for payment by Mr. Perkins
and payments to Mr. Perkins by Wallace. In the lower court, Ms. Ekins sought to strike portions
of the Affidavit of Davis Jewkes as hearsay. Ms. Ekins has renewed that argument asking this
Court to exclude inadmissible evidence in order to decide this appeal.
Ms. Ekins' hearsay argument misunderstands the hearsay rule. Rule 801(c) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c). It is well-established that when an out-of-court
statement is offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is true, the
statement is not proscribed by the hearsay rule. State v. Sorenson, 617 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah
1980); State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982). A statement that is offered for some
purpose other than to prove its own truth is a "verbal act" and is not hearsay. Durfey v. Board of
Education, 604 P.2d 480, 484-485 (Utah 1979).

While not necessary for the disposition of this appeal, Wallace can easily argue under the doctrine of
subrogation that having paid the commission to Perkins, Wallace is entitled to stand in his shoes and assert his
rights against Ms. Ekins. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983,
985 (Utah 1996) (defining subrogation as "'an equitable doctrine that allows a person or entity which pays the loss
or satisfies the claim of another under a legally cognizable obligation or interest to step into the shoes of the other
person and assert that person's right'" (citation omitted)).

4
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In this case, the statements of Mr. Perkins are not offered to prove that he is
entitled to the commissions in dispute. Rather, the statements are merely offered to prove that
Mr. Perkins claims to be entitled to the commissions. As such, Mr. Perkins' statements are not
offered for their truth and are not hearsay. Whether viewed in light of subrogation or Mr.
Perkins' rights, it is clear that this is a dispute that falls within the intent of the arbitration
provision.2
Ms. Ekins next argues that even if this is a dispute among salespersons, it is not a
dispute among current salespersons and a dispute of current salespersons is required under the
arbitration agreement. Ms. Ekins misconstrues the agreement. The relevant provision states that
"any disagreement or dispute between Salesperson [Ms. Ekins] and other salesperson under
contract with Broker" shall be governed by arbitration. Nothing in this provision requires Ms.
Ekins to be a "current" Wallace salesperson.
Finally, Ms. Ekins argues that "she never received notice of any claim, demand,
disagreement or dispute" that another Wallace salesperson asserted regarding the commissions at
issue in this case. Brief of Appellee, P. 13. This argument misstates and ignores the facts. As
stated above, Ms. Ekins has been on notice since January, 1996 regarding Mr. Perkins role in the
Research Park transaction.

2

Viewing the Independent Contractor Agreement as a whole, it is clear that the intent of the arbitration provision
is to prevent Wallace from having to pay a commission twice. This case involves exactly such a dispute.

5
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Ms. Ekins semantic arguments that she has sued Wallace and has not sued another
Wallace salesperson is without merit.3 As noted above, any argument regarding the scope of an
arbitration clause should be construed in favor of arbitration. This Court should therefore hold
that the arbitration agreement applies to this dispute.
II.

THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE.
Ms. Ekins further attempts to invalidate the Independent Contractor Agreement by

arguing that it is unenforceable. Specifically, Ms. Ekins argues that the Agreement does not
constitute a meeting of the minds, lacks mutuality and is unconscionable. A party seeking to
have a contract set aside has the burden of proving that the contract in unenforceable. Sosa v.
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361 (Utah 1996).
A.

THE PARTIES MUTUALLY ASSENTED TO THE AGREEMENT.

Ms. Ekins argues that her agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable because the
agreement references the Salesperson's Policies and Procedures Manual. Ms. Ekins argues that
because she was unaware of the Manual's contents, she is not bound by the agreement to
arbitrate.
This argument overlooks the contractual principle that "parties may incorporate by
reference into their contract the terms of some other document." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 299
(1963). Indeed, as long as the reference to the extraneous document is clear and unequivocal in

Ms. Ekins also asserts that the trial court found that the arbitration agreement does not apply to this case.
However, a review of the complete record reveals that the trial judge made no such finding. Indeed, at one point
in its ruling the court stated that "the agreement clearly applies." Transcript of Proceedings 29: 10-14.

6
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the contract, the document is incorporated into the contract. Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886
P.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Furthermore, the parties need not know the terms of the
incorporated document as long as the terms are "easily available to the contracting parties." Id.
See also, Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Arbitration agreements frequently reference other documents rather than set forth
all of the arbitration procedures in the contract itself. See, e.g., Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick
Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1986). A contract that references the arbitration
rules of the American Arbitration Association or National Association of Securities Dealers does
not render the arbitration provision unenforceable. Id.
In this case, Ms. Ekins has not established that the document referenced in the
contract was unavailable. Ms. Ekins merely argues that she never read the incorporated rules
and she is therefore not bound by them. Because she has failed to carry her burden of proving
that the contract lacked mutual assent, Ms. Ekins should be bound by the agreement that she
signed.

B.

THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT LACK MUTUALITY.

Ms. Ekins next argues that the arbitration agreement is void because it lacks
mutuality of obligation. This argument lacks merit.
Mutuality of obligation is an essential element of a contract. Ross v. Producers
Mut. Ins. Co., 295 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah 1956). However, "a plea that a contract is defective in

/jdd/130672
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this regard is really a statement that the contract lacks consideration." Id. In cases where lack of
mutuality is raised as a defense to a contract, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the issue to
be determined "is whether, considering the contract as a whole, the [party was] left without valid
consideration for [its] promise." Id. (emphasis added). Whenever possible, a contract should be
so construed that there are mutually binding promises on each party. Id.
In Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951), the Utah Supreme
Court examined a contract not to compete filed by the former employer of a pharmacist. The
pharmacist argued that the covenant not to compete was void because it lacked mutuality. In
holding the contract valid, the court held that "a contract does not lack mutuality merely because
its terms are harsh or its obligations unequal, or because every obligation of one party is not met
by an equivalent counter obligation of the other party." Id. at 825 (quoting Meurer Steel Barrel
Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3rd Cir. 1924)).
Ms. Ekins argues that because the arbitration provision does not specifically
require Wallace to arbitrate any dispute, the agreement lacks mutuality. However, under the
Independent Contractor Agreement Wallace was required to pay Ms. Ekins commissions and to
provide her with an office, equipment and real estate listings. Wallace performed its obligations
under the Agreement for over six years. Ms. Ekins cannot contend that the Independent
Contractor Agreement, considered as a whole, lacks mutuality.

:/jdd/130672
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C.

THE AGREEMENT IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE.

Ms. Ekins' final argument that the agreement is unenforceable is that its terms are
unconscionable. Ms. Ekins contends that the provision requiring that the arbitrators be selected
from among the salespersons working for Wallace lacks neutrality and renders the procedure
unconscionable.4
In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, courts consider whether "its
terms [are] so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party" or whether there
exists "an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain." Resource
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985) (quoting Bekins Bar V
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 462 (Utah 1983)).
In Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court
examined a challenge similar to that raised by Ms. Ekins. In Sosa, a patient agreed to submit any
malpractice claim against her orthopedic surgeon to arbitration. The agreement required that
arbitration panel consist of neutrally selected orthopedic surgeons. When the patient filed a
lawsuit, the surgeon moved to stay the litigation proceedings and compel arbitration under the
agreement. The trial court held the provision to be unconscionable and refused to stay the
litigation.

The doctrine of unconscionability can be divided into two branches: procedural and substantive. Procedural
unconscionability focuses on the formation of the agreement. Substantive unconscionability focuses on the
agreement's contents. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah
1985). Ms. Ekins does not raise any issue regarding the formation of the agreement but limits her argument to the
agreement's substance.

9
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On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The court held that
the patient had "not presented any evidence of likely bias-only assertion" and refused to find the
provision unconscionable.
This case is analogous to Sosa. The fact that the arbitrators are to be selected
from among the independent contractors who are former colleagues of Ms. Ekins does not render
the proceeding biased. None of the potential arbitrators have a pecuniary interest in the outcome
and this Court should require more of a showing of bias than Ms. Ekins' assertion.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to determine that the provision for selecting
arbitrators is unconscionable, that does not render the Agreement unenforceable. In Sosa, the
court held that an unconscionable provision does not render the entire agreement void. Rather,
the Utah Supreme Court instructed the lower court to sever the unconscionable provision "and
enforce the remainder of the agreement." Id. at 365. Accordingly, this Court should excise any
unconscionable provision and compel the parties to arbitrate pursuant to their agreement.5
III.

WALLACE DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATE.
Ms. Ekins finally argues that Wallace waived its contractual right to arbitrate by

failing to set forth in its Answer an affirmative defense that this dispute is subject to arbitration.
However it is well-settled that a party's failure to refer to an arbitration provision in its answer
does not waive its right to arbitrate. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co.,

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-5(2), (4) provides: "If no procedure [for appointment of arbitrators] is specified, or if
the agreed method fails or cannot be followed for any reason, or if an arbitrator fails or is unable to act, any party
to the arbitration agreement may move the court to appoint one or more arbitrators, as necessary. . . . Upon this
motion, the court shall appoint the necessary arbitrators, whom the court shall find qualified to arbitrate the issues
stated in the motion.

10
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460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), the United States Supreme Court examined the Federal Arbitration
Act and held that any doubts concerning arbitrable issues "should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."
In American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, 96 F.3d 88 (4th
Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit examined a case where the party seeking to compel arbitration did
not raise arbitration as a defense in its answer. The court held that because of the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration, courts "will not lightly infer the circumstances constituting waiver"
and the party opposing arbitration "bears the heavy burden of proving waiver." Id. at 95.
(quoting Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court held
that failure to raise arbitration as an affirmative defense does not constitute waiver. Id. at 96.
See also, Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 982-983 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that failure to raise arbitration provision as affirmative defense did not waive right to
arbitrate).
Utah shares the federal policy favoring arbitration. The Utah Supreme Court has
consistently recognized "the strong public policy in favor of arbitration 'as an approved, practical
and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.'" Chandler v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992) (quoting Robinson & Wells, P. C v.
Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983)). Given the public policy in favor of arbitration, this
Court should hold that the mere failure to raise arbitration as an affirmative defense does not
constitute waiver.
11
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Furthermore, Ms. Ekins has suffered no prejudice as required by Chandler. Ms.
Ekins alleged prejudice consists of receiving documents from Wallace and subpoenaing
documents from a third party. All such documents will be as admissible in arbitration as they
would be in formal litigation. Ms. Ekins also attempts to manufacture additional prejudice by
citing the attorney's fees that she spent in filing a complaint and researching the case. Again,
such preparation is not unique to litigation and simply does not amount to the prejudice required
under Chandler. Because Wallace has not caused undue delay and Ms. Ekins has suffered no
prejudice, Wallace has not waived its right to arbitrate.
CONCLUSION
Wallace and Ms. Ekins entered into an enforceable arbitration agreement that
governs the dispute before this Court. Wallace has at no time waived that contractual right.
Wallace therefore respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling and enter an
order compelling the parties to arbitrate their dispute.
DATED this I t )

day of April, 1998

Jolm E. S. Robsdt
JohiH^ Dunn
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 1/0 day of April, 1998, I caused to be hand
delivered two true and correct copies of foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to:
James C. Swindler, Esq.
Johnson & Hatch
Suite 400
10 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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GROUP LC.

January 16,1996

Certified Mail

Mr. David Jewkes
Wallace Associates Business Properties Group
165 South Main
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
RE:

410 CHIPETA WAY, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

Dear David:
This letter serves to confirm our conversation on January 9, 1996 regarding the
consolidation of eight (8) separate lease agreements for the University of Utah at 410
Chipeta Way. Below, please find an outline of the existing lease agreements in
question and the terms of the new lease agreement which is presently out for the
Tenant's signature.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH LEASE AGREEMENT (EXISTING):
410
CHIPETA
WAY
U OF U DEPARTMENT

| SUITE # 1
|

I

100

156

RENTABLE
SQ. FT.
2ND LEVEL

RENTABLE
SQ.FT.
1ST LEVEL

EXPIRATION
DATE

| U of U Cardiovascular #1

3,494

12/31/00

|

U of U Coll. Of Medicine
(Physiology)

24,855

4/24/97

I

13,184

4/24/97

|

Poison Control
|

211

U of U Lung Health

1,322

7/31/96

|

|

213

U Med. Ctr Orthopedic Billing

2,845

8/31/98

|

|

215

| U of U Cardiovascular #2

1,580

3/31/97

|

|

219

| U of U SSRD/STACC

|

3,615

9/30/00

|

|

222

I U of U Physiology-Storage

I

1.615

1/31/97

I

I

S-1

I

536

4/24/97

I

I TOTALS

|

28,885 |

One Utah Center
201 South Main Suite 1050
Salt Lake Otv. Utah 84111-4904
Office 801-355-2000
Fax 801-355-8166

I
24.161

Page 2
NEW LEASE TERMS:
Base Rental Rate:

$8.55 per rentable square foot, per annum, on a triple net
lease basis. The above represents a blended lease rate
for the first and second levels—See Schedule 1 attached.

Lease Term:

Ten (10) years.

Base Rental Increase:

The Base Rental Rate as set forth above is subject to an
increase at the expiration of the twelfth (12th) calendar
month after the Lease Term commences, and on the
expiration of each 12th calendar month thereafter. The
base for computing the increase is the Consumer Price
Index for all urban consumers (1984 = 100) with a minimum
increase of three and one-half percent (3.5%) and a
maximum increase of eight percent (8%).

Operating Expenses:

In addition to the Base Rental Rate, Tenant shall be
responsible for its proportionate share of the Operating
Expenses for the Building, which includes but is not limited
to, utilities, property taxes, building insurance, and repairs
and maintenance. Tenant's proportionate share is
approximately 91.89%.

Please note, the above Base Rental Rate represents an increase of approximately 60%
greater than the old rental rate. This 60% increase also does not reflect the increase
in revenues from an early renewal, as well as, the annual base rental increases. Also,
there were no tenant concessions or tenant refurbishment allowances to be paid by
BGK.
The above lease terms, as also defined in the Lease Agreement out for signature, was
only approved by BGK after a comprehensive analysis of each of the eight (8) lease
agreements, and a thorough research and analysis of market lease comparables.
Patricia Martin (Cheryl Willoughby's predecessor) and Ed Gilbert, both reviewed these
terms, and had a complete understanding of reasons this transaction would be very
profitable for BGK, and were motivated to bring the lease to execution.
It is my understanding through your verbal communication, that BGK does not intend
to complete this transaction, and has informed Wallace Associates to terminate the
negotiations.

BPG

Business Properties

One Utah Center • 201 South Main Suite 1050 • Salt Lake Dty Utah 841114904

Page 3
Accordingly, I consider myself released from my obligation to represent BGK*s interest
without however, compromising my commission position in the event negotiations
continue. Please let me know within five (5) business days if your understanding or
their intentions are to the contrary.
Sincerely,

\jy«u{Lz&*
Debra A. Ekins, CCIM
Office Properties
DAE/ps
enclosures
OEBRA/CHIPETAi.TR

BPG

Business Properties
rontoi r

One Utah Center • 201 South Mem Suite 1050 • Salt lake Gty. Utah 8411U904
rw,*- om istLonnn - c— om «»cc oif?«?

SCHEDULE 1
LEASE PROPOSAL
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
410CHIPETAWAY
August 8,1994
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100 U of U Cardiovascular #1

3,494

01/01/93

12/31/95

01/01/96
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U of U Coll. of Medicine (Physiology)

13,184

05/01/77

04/27/94
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213 U of U Lung Health

2,846

09/01/93

08/31/98
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219 U of U Cardiovascular HZ

3,615

09/25/92

536

04/01/93

$6.60

$1,892.58

103/31/2007

$6.50 $13^63.13

03/31/2007

$11.00 $12,086.33

1^03/31/2007
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03/31/2007
09/01/98

09/24/95
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222 U of U Physiology-Storage

04/25/97

03/31/2007
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$11.00

$2,607.92

$11.00

$3,313.75

03/31/2007
09/25/95

04/24/97

RHilli
03/31/2007

04/26/97
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$6.60

$290.33
$37,793.62
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January 16,1996
Mr. Glenn Warnick
University of Utah
School of Medicine
50 N. Medical Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84132
Re: 410 & 420 Chipeta Way
Dear Mr. Warnick:
I represent Research Park Associates who is the owner/landlord of the above
referenced buildings. It has come to my attention that there may possibly be some
confusion with respect to the various University of Utah leases located at these
buildings and I wanted to dear up any misunderstandings.
Last March, as you will probably recall, there was a lease proposal to consolidate
all of the University of Utah leases into one masterlease. This offer expired April
28,1995. There was still some effort to do something shortly after this deadline
but nothing came to fruition. In addition the Cardiovascular #1 and #2 leases which
were to be part of the original consolidation were renewed individually. Because
of the expiration of the original proposal and the extreme time delay we consider
any proposals void or terminated with regards to consolidating the leases. Any
future proposals vvouldjrieed to be negotiated from scratch.
__
The agent at the time who worked on these proposals was Debra Ekins who is now
no longer with Wallace Associates and who no longer is our representative in any
lease matters. Our authorized leasing agent with Wallace Associates is Collin
Perkins and our authorized managing agent is Renee Schmid.
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In addition, there has been some recent communication regarding where a lease
amendment for Homeskilled Long Term of the University of Utah is. I am afraid I
am perplexed by this as we have never agreed to a lease renewal for this entity
and have never seen any proposed rates, etc. in connection with this. This is not
to imply that we do not have a desire to renew the lease, only that we have never
had any discussions regarding this. If this is something which was discussed
between you and Ms. Ekins, it should not be construed as a pending transaction
as it was never discussed with our office.
Our authorized agent, Collin Perkins of Wallace Associates will be contacting you
in the near future about your lease renewals. I sincerely apologize for any
confusion that occurred during and after Oebra Ekins' transition from Wallace
Associates. I hope you understand that because of her prior fiduciary
responsibility as our agent, it would be unethical for her to remain involved in any
future transaction with any existing tenant at these properties unless of course you
desire to retain her and pay her directly as your Tenant representative.
We appreciate the University of Utah as a tenant and we look forward to a long
term relationship with the University. Should you have any questions please do
not hesitate to call either Collin Perkins or Renee Schmid of Wallace Associates or
myself directly.
Sincerely,

Cheryl S. Willoughby, CCIM
Senior Vice President
/csw
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January 22, 1996

Ms. Debra Ekins, CCIM
Business Properties Group, L.C.
201 South Main Street, Suite 1050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904

Re:

410 Chipeta/University of Utah

Dear Debra,
I am in receipt of your letter dated January 16, 1996.
I am forwarding, with this letter, a copy of a letter from BGK, received after our
inquiry regarding the status of the subject negotiations.
After my review of the attached letter from the client, I have concluded that there is
not a pending transaction with BGK and the University of Utah.

Respectfully,

David L. Jewkes
Wallace Associates Business
Properties Group
end.
cc:

Cheryl S. Willoughby, CCIM
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